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I. INTRODUCTION: AN EVERYDAY PROBLEM
Consider a seemingly simple dilemma that virtually all practicing law-
yers face at some point in their careers and that many practitioners face
daily. The lawyer receives an all-too-familiar visit from two friends who
together ask the lawyer to form a legal entity for their new business. (As-
sume, for the purposes of this hypothetical, that the business form chosen is
a corporation.2 ) In this initial meeting, the friends ask the lawyer to prepare
the necessary organizational documents. This task, which lawyers engage in
daily,3 sounds simple enough, and there would be near universal agreement
that the lawyer may undertake this representation.4 But numerous conflicts
of interest are certain to arise between the friends, if not during formation
then during the operation of the corporation,5 and these are often ignored or
deemed unimportant by the lawyer. Indeed, as this Article will show, even if
the lawyer appreciates these conflicts, she has no-or conflicting-guidance
in resolving them.
For example, consider some common questions that arise during forma-
tion. To issue stock to the friends, the lawyer must know whether they will
be equal owners or majority-minority owners. If the latter, does the lawyer
1. Although this hypothetical assumes only two friends for the sake of simplicity, its lessons are
easily extrapolated to multiple individuals starting a business together.
2. Ethics rules regarding conflicts of interest apply equally to all business forms. See infra Part
Il.B.2. The substantive law of confidentiality and attorney-client privilege, however, may vary. See infra
notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
3. According to the U.S. Small Business Administration, there were approximately 572,900 small
businesses opened in 2003, and there were approximately 23.7 million total small businesses in opera-
tion in the United States in 2003. U. S. Small Business Administration, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http:llappl.sba.gov/faqslfaqindex.cfm?arealD-24 (questions 4 and 5) (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). In
comparison, there are only about 12,000 public companies operating in the United States (based on the
number of companies filing annual reports on Forms 10K and 1OKS in 2003). Management's Reports on
Internal Control Financial over Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic
Reports, Securities Act Release No. 33,8238, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 5, 2003).
4. Professor Lawrence Mitchell, presenting a similar hypothetical, states that "[alt this point, the
[ethical rules] permit, and even encourage, the lawyer to comply with [the client's] request to prepare the
papers." Lawrence E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close Corporation: Toward a Real-
istic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466, 482 (1989).
5. See William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent? An Anat-
omy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REV. 57, 59 (2003).
The law tends to characterize... organizations as unitary "entities" or "legal persons" and to
suggest the lawyers' duties to such clients are analogous to their duties to individual clients.
In fact, however, these organizations consist of multiple individuals with potentially differing
interests, and hence they are prone to internal conflicts that do not arise in individual repre-
sentation.
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have a duty to advise the minority shareholder that, without contractual pro-
tections, he could be outvoted on all matters?6 Without legal guidance, an
unsophisticated minority shareholder would not know that his appointments
as an initial officer and director of the corporation are subject to the major-
ity shareholder choosing not to remove him from these positions.7
The lawyer's dilemma, in its most-stripped-down form, is this: Who is
the lawyer's client? Simply the corporation as an entity? Both shareholders?
One shareholder to the exclusion of the other? Or some combination of the
foregoing? Lawyers have faced potential civil liability and disciplinary ac-
tions for failing to appreciate the entity-owner distinction, 8 and clients are
usually even more confused.
Assume the client is the corporation as an entity. This would provide no
guidance for the lawyer when determining whether to advise the minority
shareholder of the possible perils of this status. It would be impossible for
the lawyer to know at the time of incorporation whether it would be better
for the corporation if the majority shareholder could effectively eliminate
the minority shareholder's management rights.9 Maybe the majority share-
6. See, e.g., Cynthia S. Grandfield, Comment, The Reasonable Expectations of Minority Share-
holders in Closely Held Corporations: The Morality of Small Businesses, 14 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 381, 383
(2002).
For example, in a three man corporation, if each shareholder owns a one-third interest and
two shareholders join together against the other, the third shareholder will lose in every
vote-two-thirds to one-third. . . . Oftentimes, minority shareholders inadequately plan for
such an occurrence because they do not anticipate future disputes or oppression.
Id. A majority shareholder's power is not unlimited, however. The courts have developed certain doc-
trines prohibiting the oppression of minority shareholders. See infra note 12. However, the protections
offered can vary widely from state to state. See Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of
Closely Held Corporations, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1099 (1999) (comparing Delaware, New York, and Mas-
sachusetts law). In addition, many shareholders of closely held businesses will not be able to afford the
legal fees necessary to enforce these doctrines in formal legal proceedings, and therefore it is preferable
to adopt contractual protections against oppressive treatment from the outset. A majority shareholder
may think twice if certain actions would be a clear breach of contract, and breach of a specific contract
provision may be easier to prove-if a legal dispute does ensue-than a breach of the general doctrine of
minority oppression.
7. Even in an equal ownership situation, where it may appear that nothing the lawyer does in the
organizational stages would benefit one shareholder over the other, this may not necessarily be the case.
Although there appears to be less potential for conflicts between the shareholders in this situation, cer-
tain provisions in corporate articles of incorporation and bylaws can affect equal shareholders differ-
ently. For example, the lawyer may be called on to suggest the officer positions assigned to each share-
holder. Each position ranks differently in the management hierarchy and carries a different set of respon-
sibilities. Professor Mitchell also provides an enlightening example of how equal owners may be dispar-
ately affected by the form of entity chosen by counsel. See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 482-83.
8. Compare Granewich v. Harding, 985 P.2d 788, 790 (Ore. 1999) (holding that a lawyer can be
civilly liable for acting in concert with close corporation majority shareholders who effect a "squeeze
out" of a minority shareholder in breach of their fiduciary duties) with Skarbrevik v. Cohen, 282 Cal.
Rptr. 627, 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that a close corporation's minority shareholder can not
recover against a lawyer when his interest is diluted by the majority shareholder because there is no
attomey-client relationship established with the minority shareholder). See also infra notes 62-69 and
accompanying text (discussing two Oregon cases in which disciplinary actions were brought against
lawyers and an implied attorney-relationship between the lawyer and the individual shareholders was
found).
9. Professor William Simon discusses the same concern in the context of a potential corporate
takeover. Simon, supra note 5, at 77-78. In such a situation, the lawyer will not know whether current
management or the challenger will be better for the corporation. Id.
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holder is more business-savvy, or perhaps the majority shareholder will
prove too impetuous in his decision-making and the minority shareholder's
veto power on important decisions will keep him in check. In short, the
lawyer will most likely be unable to predict which shareholder will be the
better decision-maker at the outset. Moreover, even if the lawyer could haz-
ard a guess, it is unadvisable to put the lawyer in the position of having to
make subjective decisions that involve business, rather than legal, judg-
ment.10
Assume the client is only the majority shareholder. If the lawyer advises
the minority shareholder to prospectively guard against oppressive conduct,
the majority shareholder may have a cause of action against the lawyer."
Now assume the client is only the minority shareholder. If the lawyer did
not advise the minority shareholder of the dangers of this status,' 2 the law-
yer could be liable to the shareholder for inadequate representation. If both
shareholders are deemed the lawyer's clients, the lawyer will face ethical
conflicts of interest problems.'
3
To complicate matters, a lawyer forming a closely held corporation is
usually asked to prepare a shareholders agreement to govern internal mat-
ters between the shareholders.' 4 The shareholders agreement should pro-
vide, at the very least, a restriction on the transferability of shares. 15 Such a
provision prevents one shareholder from selling his shares to a third party
10. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
11. Although the shareholders are not technically "adverse" at this stage, the lawyer should prompt
them to think of such "what-ifs" when structuring their relationship. See infra notes 94-102 and accom-
panying text. Viewed in this light, advice beneficial to one shareholder and detrimental to another is
equivalent to an asset purchase transaction where the buyer's lawyer warns the seller of the dangers in
not taking collateral security for the buyer's future payment obligations. A buyer's lawyer would (right-
fully) never provide this advice.
12. The doctrine of minority oppression gives minority shareholders some protection against major-
ity oppression. Before this doctrine emerged (which allows minority shareholders to claim that the
majority dealt with them unfairly or frustrated their reasonable expectations), majority shareholders
could use their control position to treat minority shareholders as they pleased. Often, the majority would
"squeeze out" the minority (i.e., deprive minority shareholders of employment, dividends, and return on
capital) to force a sale of the minority shareholder's shares for a substantially discounted price. See Note,
Oppressed Shareholders in Close Corporations: A Market-Oriented Statutory Remedy, 16 CARDOZO L.
REV. 501. 508-09 (1994); see generally Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Cor-
porations: Oppression, Fiduciary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations, 28 J. CORP. L. 371 (2003);
Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression v. Employment at Will in the Close Corporation: The Invest-
ment Model Solution, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 517 (1999). For the opposing view-that the minority op-
pression doctrine creates significant costs for close corporations and allows minority shareholders to
engage in opportunistic behavior-see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations
and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 283-90 (1986).
13. See infra Part I.B.3.
14. In the limited liability company context, corporate governance matters and agreements between
owners (members) would be addressed in an operating agreement (called a limited liability company
agreement in some states, including Delaware). In the partnership context, they would be addressed in a
partnership agreement (a partnership agreement, limited partnership agreement, or even limited liability
limited partnership agreement, depending on the type of partnership).
15. Numerous other provisions can also be addressed in a shareholders agreement, including provi-
sions for: establishing the value of cashed-out shares when available exit mechanisms are used; estab-
lishing voting rights in the corporation (i.e., which decisions require unanimity and which only require a
majority); breaking deadlocks when two equal shareholders cannot agree on a course of action; and
maintaining the status quo of minority shareholders.
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without first giving the remaining shareholder the right to buy them (com-
monly referred to as a "right of first refusal" provision). This gives share-
holders the right to choose with whom they do business.
17
Often shareholders will instruct the lawyer to "prepare your standard
shareholders agreement." The lawyer should respond that "there is no stan-
dard shareholders agreement" because each business and each set of share-
holder relationships is unique. Moreover, almost every drafting choice the
lawyer makes will favor one shareholder over the other. This is easy to see
when considering the majority-minority ownership situation. For instance,
shareholders agreements commonly divide decisions into those that can be
made by a mere majority and those that require the unanimous approval of
the shareholders. Lawyers representing majority shareholders prefer that no
decisions require unanimous consent-that way, their clients ultimately
make all decisions. 18 Conversely, lawyers representing minority sharehold-
ers would prefer that a broad range of decisions require unanimous consent,
thus giving their clients more of a voice in the operation and affairs of the
corporation.' 9 It is difficult to see how the lawyer who represents only the
corporation, or both shareholders, or who does not appreciate the subtleties
of client identity, can adequately draft a shareholders agreement. Yet law-
yers do it daily.
The foregoing discussion may lead the reader to conclude that these
problematic drafting choices only present themselves in the majority-
minority situation, and that representation of the nebulous "corporation," or
even co-representation of the shareholders, is a harmless fiction in the equal
ownership situation. Although client identity may be less of a concern in the
equal ownership situation, important drafting choices benefiting one share-
holder over another still exist. 20 How the lawyer drafts the corporation's
16. A common alternative or supplement to the right of first refusal provision is the "buy-sell"
provision, under which one shareholder sets a share price and, based on that price, the other shareholder
must elect to either purchase the offering shareholder's shares or sell his shares to the offering share-
holder. See, e.g., Jason M. Hoberman, Note, Practical Considerations for Drafting and Utilizing Dead-
lock Solutions for Non-Corporate Business Entities, 2001 COLum. Bus. L REV. 231, 232-33.
17. This is a fundamental principle of partnership law. See, e.g., Paula J. Dalley, The Law of Partner
Expulsions: Fiduciary Duty and Good Faith, 21 CARDoZO L. REV. 181, 181 (1999) ("The law recog-
nizes that, in view of the close relationship between partners, partners must be free to associate with
anyone they choose."). Shareholders of closely held corporations are often treated by the law as partners
in their relationships with each other. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
18. The corporate codes of states such as Delaware only mandate a minimum number of shares
necessary to approve any action submitted to a vote of the shareholders. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8. §
216 (2001). In other words, without some contractual right giving a minority shareholder veto power, he
can be outvoted on all matters submitted to a vote of the shareholders. But see supra note 12 (discussing
the minority oppression doctrine).
19. For a negative view of unanimity agreements, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 296.
Unanimity agreements, which exist in many closely held corporations, create a risk of dead-
lock. A minority shareholder may ... refuse to consent to corporate acts, paralyzing the firm.
Although this right helps minority shareholders protect themselves against opportunistic be-
havior by the majority, it creates incentives for the minority to behave opportunistically to-
ward the majority to extract disproportionate concessions.
Id.
20. For example, it initially appears that any right of first refusal provision will affect all sharehold-
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internal documents again depends on who is classified as the lawyer's cli-
ent. The foregoing discussion focuses on potential conflicts during the cor-
poration's initial stages, but lawyers will continue to encounter these ethi-
cally gray issues once the corporation is up and running.21
Part II of this Article explores the existing ethical rules applicable to
lawyers representing closely held businesses. I argue that the majority ap-
proach taken by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Model
Rules") 22-that the lawyer represents the entity itself and not its individual
owners (sometimes referred to as the "entity" theory)-is incomplete be-
cause it does not guide the lawyer seeking to negotiate an agreement or re-
solve a dispute between the individual owners. (I often refer to such matters
as "owner relationship issues.") Recognizing the impracticalities of the en-
tity theory as applied to closely held businesses, some courts have held that
the lawyer's clients are actually the entity and each of the entity's individual
owners (sometimes referred to as the "aggregate" or "joint representation"
theory). But as I will show, this solution is flawed because it puts the lawyer
in a precarious situation when dealing with owner relationship issues. In
short, each of the lawyer's actions inevitably favors one owner-and thus
one client--over another, thereby often creating impermissible conflicts of
interest that informed consent cannot cure.23 Part II also examines other
solutions advanced by commentators.
Part III proposes a new solution to this problem. It first distinguishes
between "internal" and "external" matters that arise in representing closely
held businesses. Internal matters involve the inner workings of the entity,
and in particular owner relationship issues. External matters involve the
entity's interactions with third parties, whether customers, suppliers, lenders
or potential investors. I propose that the best way for a lawyer to provide
complete representation to the entity, yet avoid conflicts of interest, is to
permit the lawyer to represent one owner on internal matters and to repre-
ers equally. This is not true, however, if the shareholders have significantly different financial situations.
If the lawyer drafts the provision so that the shareholder exercising the right of first refusal must pay for
the shares in cash within thirty days, the shareholder in the better financial position is favored-he is
more likely to have the cash on hand to procure the buyout. On the other hand, a provision permitting the
exercising shareholder to pay for the shares with ten percent cash down and the remainder in five equal
annual installments would allow a shareholder in a weaker financial position to obtain financing, buy the
shares, and prevent a sale to the third party. Hoberman, supra note 16, at 248-49. This is an example of a
drafting choice, present even in the equal ownership situation, benefiting one shareholder over another.
21. For example, consider the potential admission of a new shareholder. Assume that one co-
founder of the corporation believes that this new shareholder would supply the corporation with much-
needed capital and the benefits of prior business experience. The other co-founder opposes the admission
of a new shareholder, however, because he does not want his interest to be diluted, or he would prefer
not to bring in an "outsider." Can the first co-founder admit the new shareholder despite the second co-
founder's objection? The co-founder will certainly ask the lawyer this question. Whether the lawyer
should provide this advice depends yet again on who the lawyer's client is.
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2004) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
23 While the focus of this Article is on conflicts of interests, which implicate the lawyer's cardinal
duty of loyalty, confidentiality and attorney-client privilege concerns are also important and will be
discussed in notes 73-74 and 191-92 and accompanying text.
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sent the entity on external matters.2 4 Lawyers must only withdraw from rep-
resentation when the interests of these internal and external clients conflict
(which I contend happens far less frequently than conflicts between individ-
ual owners). This approach provides clear guidance on client identity re-
gardless of the complexity of the situation, and thus saves lawyers and cli-
ents from potentially perilous judgments as to the appropriateness of co-
individual client representation. As a proposed codification of this approach,
Part IV presents a new rule, specific to closely held businesses, to supple-
ment the existing ethical rules.
II. THE CURRENT RULES AND SCHOLARLY THEORIES
A. The Entity Theory
1. Model Rule 1.13: Organization as Client
The entity theory-that the lawyer represents the entity itself and not its
individual constituents-is the most widely accepted theory of entity repre-
sentation.26 It is also the theory adopted by both the Model Rules and the
Model Code. Model Rule 1.13(a), titled "Organization as Client," provides
that "[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the or-
ganization acting through its duly authorized constituents., 27 Similarly, the
Model Code provides:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity
owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director,
officer, employee, representative, or other person connected with
the entity. In advising the entity, a lawyer should keep paramount
24. While the Model Rules allow a lawyer to also represent an entity's constituents, traditional
application is limited to the very different public corporation context. The prototypical example is a
public corporation law firm that wishes to defend the corporation and its senior officers in a lawsuit
brought by a third party. See infra Part II.A.3 for a full discussion.
25. Because the Model Rules have been adopted by far more states (thirty-eight plus the District of
Columbia) than any other set of rules, they are the ethical rules primarily discussed in this Article. ABA,
Links to State Ethical Rules Governing Lawyer Advertising, Solicitation and Marketing, at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/clientdevelopmentadrules.htnJ (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). The
Model Code of Professional Conduct ("Model Code") is also discussed where relevant. MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1981) [hereinafter Model Code]. Four states have adopted the Model Code,
and nine have adopted unique rules. http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/clientdevelopmentadrules.html
(last visited Oct. 10, 2004).
26. See Charles W. Wolfram, Legal Ethics: Corporate-Family Conflicts, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL
ETHICS 295, 309 (1999) ("No sustainable theory has been able to challenge the supremacy of the entity-
representation concept."); see also Meehan v. Hopps, 301 P.2d 10, 14 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956) ("The
attorney for a corporation represents it, its stockholders and its officers in their representative capacity.
He in [no way] represents the officers personally."); Skarbrevik v. Cohen, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627, 635 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1991).
27. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R. 1.13(a).
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its interests and his professional judgment should not be influenced
28by the personal desires of any person or organization.
The entity theory is based on two ideas: that an organization is a distinct
legal entity; and that under the laws of agency, a lawyer, as agent of the
29
entity-principal, owes her duties to the principal and not its other agents.
2. Why the Entity Theory is Incomplete
Despite the use of the generic term "organization" in Model Rule
1.13(a), which encompasses all entity forms, 30 it has been suggested that
Model Rule 1.13 was drafted with the traditional corporation in mind. 3' The
traditional corporation-which conjures up images of Ford, Microsoft, and
General Electric-has been described as "an economic organization in
which: (1) management and shareholding are separable and separated func-
tions; (2) shares are held by a number of persons; and (3) shares are freely
transferrable and neither entry to nor exit from the firm is restricted. ' 32 Cor-
porations whose stock is publicly traded fall into this category, as do private
corporations that function more like public corporations than partnerships.
A closely held business is very different.33 There is no precise definition
of a closely held business, though they are often easily identifiable (think of
the new corporation formed by the two friends in the introductory hypo-
thetical). For purposes of this Article, I will adopt a general definition sug-
gested by Professor Michael Dooley: a closely held business is a business
whose "distinguishing characteristic ... is that management and sharehold-
ing are not separated functions., 34 Other characteristics of closely held
businesses include the issuance of private equity (stock or interests that are
not publicly-traded) and the significant personal investment of both time
and capital by shareholders.
35
28. MODEL CODE, supra note 25, at EC 5-18.
29. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361 (1991) [hereinafter ABA
Formal Op. No. 91-360] (discussing the representation of a partnership); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. &
W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 17.3 (3d ed. 2001) ("[O]fficers are co-agents along
with the lawyer in terms of their relationship to the entity.").
30. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R. 1.13 cmt. 1 ("The duties defined in this Comment apply
equally to unincorporated associations."); ABA Formal Op. No. 91-361, supra note 29 ("There is no
logical reason to distinguish partnerships from corporations or other legal entities in determining the
[organizational] client a lawyer represents."). Similarly, the Model Code uses the generic term "entity"
and discusses lawyers retained by "a corporation or similar entity." MODEL CODE, supra note 25, at EC
5-18.
31. At least one commentator has suggested that it is "indisputably clear that the draftsmen of
IModel Rule] 1.13 ... relied exclusively on the traditional corporate model." Mitchell, supra note 4, at
469 n.13.
32. MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 1010 (1995).
33. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 271 ('There is a fundamental difference between
closely and publicly held corporations.").
34. DOOLEY, supra note 32, at 1011 (emphasis added).
35. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 1.3 (1986) (describing close corpora-
tions as corporations with "only a small number (for example, fewer than thirty) of individual sharehold-
ers and whose shares are not traded on a recognized securities exchange or on the over-the-counter
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Closely held businesses can operate as corporations, partnerships, or
limited liability companies. Several states allow closely held corporations,
or "close corporations," to opt-in to special statutory treatment. 36 These
statutory schemes treat close corporations more like partnerships or limited
liability companies than like traditional corporations.
37
Although Model Rule 1.13 may work well for traditional corporations,
it has limited application to closely held business forms. There are two im-
portant differences between closely held businesses and traditional corpora-
tions that explain why applicability is limited: 38 the frequency with which
owners and lawyers interact, and the nature of the representation that the
lawyer is hired to provide.
Owners of closely held businesses have frequent interactions with law-
yers either in their capacities as owners or managers of the entity.39 One of
them most likely hired the lawyer based on a pre-existing lawyer-client rela-
tionship, a friendship, or a referral.40 These personal interactions and history
give owners the impression-usually reasonable-that the lawyer represents
them individually. 41 These owners view the entity not as a separate creature,
market"); Mitchell, supra note 4, at 477 ("The most significant characteristics... [of a close corporation
are] the substantial investment by participants, the illiquidity of ownership interests, and the substantial
identity of ownership and management.").
36. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING
PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 476 (7th ed. 2001) ("The call for special legislative
treatment of closely held corporations has led to statutory developments [recognizing the problems of
closely held corporations] in most states. These statutes permit closely held corporations to depart dra-
matically from the traditional statutory scheme of shareholders/directors/officers in specified circum-
stances."); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 283 ("[Tihe much-heralded development of special
close corporation statutes recognizes the utility of a set of presumptive rules tailored to closely held
corporations.") (citation omitted).
37. See, e.g., Crosby v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 220 (Ohio 1989) ("Close corporations bear a strik-
ing resemblance to a partnership .... Just like a partnership, the relationship between the shareholders
must be one of trust, confidence and loyalty if the close corporation is to thrive."); Galbreath v. Scott,
433 So. 2d 454, 457 (Ala. 1983) (recognizing that a close corporation "acquires many of the attributes of
a partnership or sole proprietorship and ceases to fit neatly into the classical corporate scheme"); DEL
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 354 (2001):
No written agreement among stockholders of a close corporation ... shall be invalid on the
ground that it is an attempt ... by the stockholders... to treat the corporation as if it were a
partnership or to arrange relations among the stockholders or between the stockholders and
the corporation in a manner that would be appropriate only among partners.
Id.; Mitchell, supra note 4, at 469 (observing a "general recognition that the shareholders of a close
corporation are considered partners in their dealings with one another and that the corporation is an
entity only with respect to the rest of the world"); Susan Kalinka, The Limited Liability Company and
Subchapter S: Classification Issues Revisited, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1087 (1992) ("[T]he LLC has
much in common with a statutory close corporation ....").
38. See HAMILTON, supra note 36, at 476-79 (discussing the uniqueness of close corporations);
Galbreath, 433 So. 2d at 457 (adopting "attitudes toward close corporations which ... recognize a
distinction between closely and widely held corporations").
39. Note, An Expectations Approach to Client Identity, 106 HARV. L. REV. 687, 691 (1993) [herein-
after An Expectations Approach to Client Identity] ("[Tlhe attorney for a close corporation deals with a
constituent who is often a director, officer and/or shareholder .....
40. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
41. At least one well-known case, Skarbrevik v. Cohen, 282 Cal. Rptr. 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991),
may have held that the lawyer only represented the entity, and not also the shareholder claiming personal
representation, because the shareholder had no direct contact with the lawyer. See Simon, supra note 5,
at 62-63.
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but merely as an extension of themselves. Indeed, the owners have often
been operating their businesses as sole proprietorships or general partner-
ships and have incorporated simply for liability protection.42 Therefore, any
rule addressing representation of closely held businesses must adequately
differentiate between the entity and its owners and provide guidance to law-
yers when handling matters on behalf of each. Model Rule 1.13, which only
addresses representation of the entity, is only half of the equation.4 3
On the other hand, a lawyer rarely interacts with the shareholders of a
traditional corporation, who neither serve as directors nor officers of the
corporation." Therefore, it is highly unlikely that a traditional corporation's
shareholders will believe that the lawyer represents them personally. Simi-
larly, it is rare that the corporation's directors and officers believe that the
lawyer represents them personally-most directors and officers of tradi-
tional corporations are experienced and understand that the lawyer's pri-
mary duty is to the corporation.45 Also, constituents in traditional corpora-
tions are more accustomed to dealing with corporate lawyers and thus are
more likely to understand their roles as agents of the corporation.
Second, lawyers for closely held businesses and lawyers for traditional
corporations are usually hired to provide different services. Closely held
business lawyers are typically hired to incorporate the business and guide its
sometimes unsophisticated owners. These lawyers provide advice and draft
agreements dealing with the owners' internal affairs before assisting the
entity with its outside business, and regularly thereafter. It is this role that
Model Rule 1.13 completely overlooks-that owners of closely held busi-
nesses seek advice from their lawyers on matters affecting them personally.
As discussed above,46 in the owners' minds, they and the entity are one and
the same.
Conversely, lawyers for traditional corporations tend to focus primarily
on assisting the corporation with its outside business. Although lawyers for
traditional corporations may incorporate the business or prepare minutes
from board meetings, significant internal matters such as owner relationship
42. Simon, supra note 5, at 67 (theorizing that shareholders in a close corporation "may think of
incorporation primarily as a means of limiting liability or gaining tax advantage, and may not think of it
as affecting internal relationships at all"); see also Mitchell, supra note 4, at 478-79 (observing that
"counsel for the close corporation typically will have regular contact with .. shareholders and may well
have personal relationships with some or all of them"); An Expectations Approach to Client Identity,
supra note 39, at 689 (arguing that in the close corporation context "[o]pportunities for such lawyer-
constituent interaction lie at the heart of the client identity problem").
43. See infra Part II.A.3 for a discussion of the potential impact of Model Rule 1.13(g) on this
omission.
44. An obvious exception is the large shareholder who demands a board seat in return for his in-
vestment.
45. If the lawyer senses a conflict between the corporation and an individual constituent, Model
Rule 1.13(f) provides guidance. "In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, mem-
bers, shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the constitu-
ents with whom the lawyer is dealing." MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R. 1.13(f).
46. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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issues do not typically present themselves to these lawyers.47 For example,
shareholder agreements are not used in traditional corporations because
shares are freely transferable and held by a wide variety of shareholders
whose identities can change daily.48 Also, as mentioned before,49 the owners
and managers of traditional corporations are more familiar with the corpo-
rate lawyer's role, and thus would not be inclined to seek personal advan-
tage or advice from the lawyer. Because of these important differences be-
tween closely held businesses and traditional corporations, each requires its
own rule for guiding lawyers in their representation.
Even when the Model Rules were substantially revised per the Ameri-
can Bar Association's "Ethics 2000" project, the shortcomings of Model
Rule 1.13 in the closely held business context were not addressed.50 Admit-
tedly, during business formation, there is no "entity" yet, and thus Model
Rule 1.13 is not the appropriate place for discussion of co-representation of
the would-be owners.5' But, this does not explain its shortcomings in ad-
dressing owner relationship issues that occur beyond formation, which may
even include drafting a shareholders agreement (if not done concurrently
with formation). Under the current structure, closely held business lawyers
must look beyond Model Rule 1.13 for guidance in addressing these is-
sues.52 Model Rule 1.7, entitled "Conflict of Interest: Current Clients," goes
further than Model Rule 1.13 in identifying the lawyer's role as to individ-
ual owners of closely held businesses.5  It is not designed for the unique
problems presented; however, it is the general rule of concurrent representa-
tion.54 This rule, and other efforts to rectify the problems with Model Rule
1.13, are discussed in Parts II.B and II.C below.
47. This is especially true of firm lawyers. Most traditional corporations have in-house legal de-
partments that handle internal matters for the corporation. Due to the added expense, firm lawyers are
sometimes brought in only to handle significant business combinations or complex litigation.
48. See DOOLEY, supra note 32, at 1010.
49. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
50. See Margaret Colgate Love, The Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary
of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 441,453 (2002) (no substantive changes in Model
Rule 1.13).
51. But see Jesse v. Danforth, 485 N.W.2d 63, 67 (Wis. 1992) (retroactively applying entity repre-
sentation concepts to a pre-incorporation group of individuals).
52. See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 470-71.
Under the [Model Rules], counsel must look to the exception, Rule 1.7 (dealing with conflicts
of interest[)], rather than the rule, Rule 1.13 (dealing with entity representation), to determine
to whom she owes her professional obligations. The [Model Code] indicates even more force-
fully that multiple representation in general is considered exceptional. Moreover, the [Model
Code], like the [Model Rules], fails to guide counsel in the close corporation situation, but
simply directs her to the rule governing multiple representation. The consequence is that the
issue of client identification, notwithstanding its frequent occurrence is necessarily resolved
by the lawyer on a case-by-case basis.
Id. (citations omitted).
53. MODEL RuLEs, supra note 22, at R. 1.7.
54. Id.
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3. The Potential Extension of Model Rule 1.13(g)
An initial reading of Model Rule 1.13(g), which provides that "[a] law-
yer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors,
officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents, subject to
the provisions of Rule 1.7, ' 5 might lead one to conclude that in fact there is
no gap left by the rule.
Despite the rule's broad language, it has traditionally been used to allow
a public corporation's regular law firm to represent a corporation and its
senior officers in litigation brought by a third party, or to represent its senior
officers in unrelated matters, such as estate planning. 6 The official com-
ment to the rule, which provides that "a lawyer for an organization may also
represent a principal officer or major shareholder, ' 57 comports with this
traditional interpretation.
In addition, this provision has only been interpreted to allow representa-
tion of an individual constituent whose interests do not conflict with those
of the lawyer's principal client, the corporation. 58 The conflicts of relevance
in the close corporation setting are usually not conflicts between the entity
and an individual owner, but between the individual owners themselves.
Finally, even if the rule's application could be extended to individual owner
conflicts, the structure of Model Rule 1.13 clearly envisions individual rep-
resentation as secondary to entity representation. In the closely held busi-
ness context, however, it could be just as important-if not more impor-
tant-than the external matters a lawyer handles for the entity.5 9 Therefore,
subsection (g) is not an adequate cure for Model Rule 1.13's omission.
B. The Aggregate Theory
1. Case Law and Scholarly Commentary
Courts and commentators have noted the unique relationships between
lawyers and shareholders of closely held businesses, and that Model Rule
1.13 does not take this into account. Some have gone to the other extreme,
finding that instead of representing no owners individually, the lawyer
55. The Model Code counterparts are EC 4-4, EC 5-16, and DR 5-105(B) & (C).
56. HAZARD & HODES, supra note 29, § 17.14.
57. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R. 1.13 cmt. 12.
58. See, e.g., Scott L Olson, The Potential Liabilities Faced by In-House Counsel, U. MIAMI BUS.
L. REV. 1,5 n.31 (1998) (interpreting New Model Rule 1.13(g) (formerly Model Rule 1.13(e)) as allow-
ing dual representation of an individual constituent and the organization, "if consent is provided by
either the shareholders or 'an appropriate official of the organization other than the individual who is
represented"'); Sean J. Griffith, Ethical Rules and Collective Action: An Economic Analysis of Legal
Ethics, 63 U. Prrr. L. REV. 347, 372 n.85 (2002) (stating that New Model Rule 1.13(g) (formerly Model
Rule 1.13(e)) "applies rule 1.7 to concurrent conflicts arising from the representation of different parts of
an organization-e.g., a corporation and an officer or employee").
59. See supra Part II.A.2 and accompanying text (discussing the difference in the types of matters
handled by close and public corporation lawyers).
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represents all of the owners individually (in addition to the entity). 60 This
approach is sometimes called the "aggregate theory" because the lawyer
represents the aggregate of the entity and its constituents. It should be noted
that the drafters of the Model Rules rejected the aggregate theory in favor of
the entity theory.61
Two Oregon cases involving disciplinary action brought against a law-
yer, In re Banks62 and In re Brownstein,63 are often cited as illustrations of
the aggregate theory. In Banks, a lawyer prepared an employment agree-
ment for a corporation's sole shareholder.64 After the corporation underwent
a change in control, the lawyer advised the new owners that the former
owner had breached his employment agreement. 65 The court found that it
was improper for the lawyer to represent the new owners adverse to the
former owner because the former owner was essentially the corporation at
the time the agreement was drafted.66 The court understood the confusion
over the lawyer's actions experienced by the former owner, who had hired
the lawyer to protect his interests "both personal and corporate, which inter-
ests were substantially identical. 67
Likewise, the lawyer in Brownstein was reprimanded for representing a
third party with interests adverse to the shareholders of a close corporation
he represented.68 The court in Brownstein, citing Banks, held that there was
a conflict because "the attorney in [the close corporation context] represents
the corporate owners in their individual capacities as well as the corporation
unless other arrangements are clearly made."69 In both cases, the court's
60. See, e.g., Opdyke v. Kent Liquor Mart, 181 A.2d 579, 583 (Del. 1962) (holding that "[tlhe
corporation [i]s simply a form for the carrying on of a joint venture ... [and the lawyer] must be re-
garded as the attorney for [the] three joint adventurers"); Woods v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 185,
188 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); see generally Ellen A. Pansky, Between an Ethical Rock and a Hard Place:
Balancing Duties to the Organizational Client and Its Constituents, 37 S. 'rEx. L. REv. 1167, 1184-87
(1996) (discussing cases in which an implied attorney-client relationship was found in the close corpora-
tion setting).
61. ABA Formal Op. No. 91-361, supra note 29. Former Model Rule 2.2, however, seemed to at
least implicitly adopt the aggregate theory. Id. A lawyer's role in the organization of a business was
addressed in the comment to the Rule, which provided that a lawyer is an intermediary "in helping to
organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs." Id. Model Rule 2.2 was replaced by
the Ethics 2000 Commission with new Model Rule 2.4, and the above-quoted language was moved to
the comments of revised Model Rule 1.7. See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R. 1.7 cmt. 28. At least
one commentator had suggested that Model Rule 2.2 provided the applicable standard of conduct in
determining the lawyer's professional responsibility when representing the closely held business. See
Bryan J. Pechersky, Note, Representing General Partnerships and Close Corporations: A Situational
Analysis of Professional Responsibility, 73 rex. L. REV. 919, 938-39 (1995) (describing this standard as
"paternalism").
62. 584 P.2d 284 (Or. 1978).
63. 602 P.2d 655 (Or. 1979).
64. Banks, 584 P.2d at 286.
65. Id. at 287.
66. Id. at 290 ("In such a situation ... common sense dictates that the corporate entity should be
ignored.").
67. Id. at 291.
68. Brownstein, 602 P.2d at 656.
69. Id. at 657.
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rationale focused on the uniqueness of close corporations, and in particular
on the expectations of the close corporation shareholders.
Commentators have also advocated the aggregate theory, often arguing
that reasons of economy and efficiency justify multiple representation when
representing closely held businesses. 70 For example, Professor Mitchell
suggests that "[b]ecause counsel's conduct will ... directly affect each of
these shareholders, it should be recognized that counsel owes a duty to each
of them.",71 Another commentator suggests that the aggregate theory "realis-
tically balances and protects the interests of clients, the legal system, and
the public. 72
Under the aggregate theory, there are no confidentiality or attorney-
client protections between co-clients, and one co-client may waive these
protections for all co-clients.73 Confidential information may also pass from
one co-client to another via the laws of confidentiality applicable to organi-
zations.74
70. These justifications will be discussed in detail in Part I.D. 1.
71. In an argument that is contrary to first impression, Professor Mitchell suggests that representing
all of the owners does not present a conflict in the majority-minority situation, but does present a conflict
if the owners have equal ownership interests. Mitchell, supra note 4, at 472. Professor Mitchell cites
Brownstein as decided correctly: "in re Brownstein ... directly confronts the issue and unequivocally
answers (correctly, I think) the frequently asked (and as frequently unanswered) question of who the
client is in the close corporation." Id. at 472 n.26. When a conflict arises in the unequal ownership situa-
tion, he argues, "counsel is obligated to advise the majority that it must deal fairly with the minority, and
counsel may even be expected by the minority to represent their interests." Id. at 503. But, he argues that
equal owners will have "equally valid claims," id. at 504, and "each of the equal sides will expect coun-
sel to assist in obtaining the advantage sought by it." Id. Although I believe that Professor Mitchell
reaches the correct conclusion in the equal ownership situation (that aggregate representation should not
be permitted), I disagree with his conclusion that aggregate representation is acceptable in the majority-
minority situation. Recall from the introductory hypothetical the ethical dilemma lawyers face if they
attempt to navigate these murky waters. Moreover, simply advising the majority that it must deal fairly
with the minority does not ensure that minority interests will be protected. So long as the majority's
treatment of the minority cannot be deemed oppressive or a violation of the majority's fiduciary duties,
which are high and vague standards, nothing prevents the majority owner from ignoring the lawyer's
admonitions. Further, in practice, many lawyers may be hesitant to advise both the majority and minority
for fear of damaging the existing relationship with the individual with which the lawyer has (or hopes to
have) a long-lasting attorney-client relationship. Professor Mitchell's approach does not adequately
address these issues.
72. Pechersky, supra note 61, at 936.
73. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, Three's A Crowd A Proposal to Abolish Joint Representation, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 387, 434-35 (2001).
74. An attorney's confidentiality obligations to a closely held business and its owners are difficult to
determine due to the intertwined interests of entity and individual. The first question is: What is confi-
dential or privileged as to third parties? An organization has the same ight to confidentiality as any
other client. But an organization's attorney-client privilege, which protects confidential communications
between lawyer and client, can be waived by the organization's management. See, e.g., Commodity
Futures Trading Comm. v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348-49 (1985); In re Silvio de Lindegg Ocean
Devs. of Am., Inc., 27 B.R. 28, 28 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that, in bankruptcy proceedings of a close
corporation, a bankruptcy trustee can waive the corporation's attorey-client privilege but not an indi-
vidual shareholder's personal privilege). For criticism of In re Silvio, see Neil E. Herman, Note, Who
Controls the Attorney-Client Privilege in Bankruptcy?, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 549, 581-82 (1985). Even if
the organization's constituents are not the lawyer's individual clients, the lawyer cannot reveal their
confidences relating to the organization to third parties. See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R. 1.13
cmt. 2 ("When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's
lawyer in that person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6.").
The second, and more interesting question, is what is confidential or privileged among the
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2. Model Rule 1.7: Conflict of Interest: Current Clients
Model Rule 1.7 safeguards a lawyer's cardinal duties of zealous repre-
sentation75 and loyalty 76 to her clients by disallowing joint concurrent repre-
sentation where it would create an improper conflict of interest] 7 Revised
Model Rule 1.7(a) provides that a concurrent conflict exists if the represen-
tation of two clients will be "directly adverse" or if there is a "significant
risk" that the representation of either client will be "materially limited. 78
Most conflicts are of the material limitation type,79 including the typically
individual owners. The general rule is that "confidential entity information in the lawyer's possession
normally should not be communicated to a fellow employee whose responsibilities do not require that he
know the information, because that individual is not a client." HAZARD & HODES, supra note 29, § 17.6.
(This, of course, reflects the entity theory of representation.) Under partnership law, "information re-
ceived by the lawyer while representing the partnership ...normally may not be withheld from the
individual partners." ABA Formal Op. 91-361, supra note 29. Compare McCain v. Phoenix Res., Inc.,
230 Cal. Rptr. 25, 29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding a lawyer may not withhold information from part-
ners on the basis of attomey-client privilege) with Buford White Lumber Co. v. Octagon Properties, Ltd.,
740 F. Supp. 1553, 1570 (W.D. Okla. 1989) (holding that an attorney has no duty to disclose to limited
partners information learned from general partners). One scholar suggests that this rule should also apply
to close corporations because, as in partnerships and other small groups of individuals, each group mem-
ber should "have relevant information to maintain continued group identity and decisionmaking abili-
ties." Russell G. Pearce, Family Values and Legal Ethics: Competing Approaches to Conflicts in Repre-
senting Spouses, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1253, 1309 (1994). This scholar also suggests that a corporate
shareholder's fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the entity may also compel him to disclose all
relevant information to the other shareholders. Id. at 1309-10.
75. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R. 1.3 cmt. 1 ("A lawyer must ... act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."); MODEL
CODE, supra note 25, at EC 7-1 ("The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to
represent his client zealously within the hounds of the law ....").
76. The lawyer's duty of loyalty has been described as "the lawyer's ultimate responsibility to a
client." Bassett, supra note 73, at 390. See also MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R. 1.7 cmt. 1 ("Loyalty
and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client.").
77. See also MODEL CODE, supra note 25, at DR 5-105(A).
A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his independent professional
judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of
the proffered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing in-
terests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
Id. MODEL CODE DR 5-105(B) is the same general concept in the context of continuing (rather than
beginning) multiple representation.
A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent profes-
sional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his repre-
sentation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing differing in-
terests, except to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
Id. at (B). DR 5-105(C) is the exception referred to in both DR 5-105(A) and (B). This exception clari-
fies that multiple representation is reserved for the unique situation.
In the situations covered by DR 5-105(A) and (B), a lawyer may represent multiple clients if
it is obvious that he can adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the
representation afterfull disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise
of his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.
Id. at (C) (emphasis added).
78. The former version of Rule 1.7 treated these two concepts separately, creating confusion over
whether one or both were required to find a concurrent conflict of interest. See Charles W. Wolfram,
Ethics 2000 and Conflicts of Interest: The More Things Change .... 70 TENN. L. REV. 27, 30 (2002).
The revised version clarifies that a conflict is created by a violation of either test, and also raises the
standard required for a material limitation conflict from "may create" to "substantial risk." Compare
MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R. 1.7(a)(2) with Id. 1.7(b).
79. See Bassett, supra note 73, at 410.
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friendly negotiations involved in the startup of a business. 80 (Although some
could be deemed to put business owners in adverse positions.) If a concur-
rent conflict exists, the lawyer may only undertake the co-representation if
both clients consent, if such consent is confirmed in writing,81 and if "the
lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide compe-
tent and diligent representation to each affected client.,
82
Revised Model Rule 1.7 echoes the Restatement view.83 The Restate-
ment's official illustrations help put into context when there is a substantial
risk of a material limitation. Directly applicable to this discussion is an illus-
tration where three individuals seek a lawyer's assistance in forming a part-
nership. 84 The partners will each contribute different things to the entity, but
few other facts are given. According to the Restatement, the lawyer may
assist in forming the partnership.
85
There are several problems with this conclusion, however. First, the
facts are extremely scant, and we have no way of knowing whether the law-
yer has a preexisting relationship with one or more of the partners. Second,
we have no way of knowing whether all of the partners are equally busi-
ness-savvy or knowledgeable about what is entailed in forming a business.
It is strange that this illustration summarily reaches the conclusion that co-
representation is acceptable when the outcomes of the three previous illus-
trations--dealing with joint representation of a husband and wife in estate
planning-vary depending on such facts.86
Finally, even if all is equal between the partners, the illustration defers
the question of what the lawyer should do if a conflict develops. It is par-
ticularly troublesome that the conflict will likely be resolved under the part-
nership documents the lawyer drafts. So what the lawyer does now, when
80. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R. 1.7 cmt. 8.
[A] lawyer asked to represent several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to
be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions
that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to others. The conflict in effect
forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of
subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the
likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materi-
ally interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives
or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.
Id.
81. The writing requirement is an addition of the Ethics 2000 Commission. See id. at R. 1.7(b)(4),
R. 1.7(b)(4) cmt. 20.
82. Id. at R. 1.7(b)(1).
83. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD, THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 130 (1998) [hereinafter,
RESTATEMENT].
Unless all affected clients consent to the representation under the limitations and conditions
provided in § 122, a lawyer may not represent two or more clients in a matter not involving
litigation if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of one or more of the
clients would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's duties to one or more of
the other clients.
Id.
84. Id. § 130 illus. 4.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 130 illus. 1-3.
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the Restatement finds no conflict, can predetermine the outcome of any
eventual conflict from which she must withdraw or be disqualified. This,
and further problems with co-representation of individual owners, are the
subject of the next section.
3. Why the Aggregate Theory Creates Impermissible
Conflicts of Interest
Despite the apparent Restatement view, there is no clear consensus on
whether joint representation of closely held business owners is ethically
permissible or desirable. Two experienced business lawyers, posed with a
scenario much like my introductory hypothetical, reached very different
conclusions.87 One lawyer felt that the practical advantages of joint repre-
sentation outweighed the disadvantages. 88 The other "concluded that the
present and potential differences are so large that separate representation is
required."89 I agree with the latter sentiment-that closely held businesses
lawyers can seldom provide competent and diligent representation to each
individual owner when joint representation is undertaken. Therefore, under
Model Rule 1.7, co-representation should not be allowed.
First, informed consent to joint representation in this setting is difficult
to achieve.90 As Professor Simon explains, "[e]ven explicit consent given
after considerable advice may be held insufficient if it later appears that an
important contingency was not foreseen."9' Even pretermitting the added
difficulties in consenting to conflicts that have not yet materialized,92 it
seems highly unlikely that a lawyer can adequately explain the benefits and
drawbacks of each decision she must make when engaging in a present task.
Although these contingencies, such as the specifics of a buy-sell provision
in a shareholders agreement,93 may appear minor at the time, they can be-
come extremely important later. Therefore, at least in practice, the informed
consent requirement poses a problem to joint representation.
Second, the notion that business startups are "friendly" rather than con-
tentious, and thus joint representation is acceptable,94 becomes a fiction if
87. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF ETHICS AND LAWYERING 682-83 (2d ed.
1994).
88. id. at 683 (citing accentuation of agreement, efficiency, and economy reasons for allowing the
joint representation).
89. See id. (pointing to the numerous unresolved, yet critical issues not readily apparent to clients);
see also Mitchell, supra note 4, at 484 ("Each [of the Model Rules and Model Code] permits counsel to
represent [two equal owners] if she can do so without compromising the representation of either. How-
ever, it is extremely difficult in my personal experience for counsel uncompromisingly to represent both
.. because their interests conflict.").
90. For the Model Rules position on informed consent, see MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R.
1.0(e) cnt. 6. See also Wolfram, supra note 78, at 42-43.
91. Simon, supra note 5, at 67.
92. Revised Model Rule 1.7 allows advance consent under certain circumstances. MODEL RULES,
supra note 22, at R. 1.7 cmt. 22.
93. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
94. See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R. 1.7 cmt. 28 (joint representation impermissible where
relationship between co-clients is antagonistic); Pechersky, supra note 61, at 939 (the lawyer "must
20041
Alabama Law Review [Vol. 56:1:181
the lawyer does her job properly. Reconsider the introductory hypothetical,
which presents the situation with the least present conflict between owners.
It is the lawyer's job to advise owners who are on friendly terms, and may
even be family members, of the unpleasant contingencies that may lie
ahead.95 The lawyer should advise them that, no matter how unlikely it is
that such contingencies will materialize, it is better to have mechanisms for
handling such events in place from the outset.
96
Stated differently, even if negotiations seem friendly at the organiza-
tional stage, the lawyer must cause the owners to imagine a time in the fu-
ture when their relationship has become contentious. This is a time when
the conflict of interest rules would disallow multiple representation.98 To
envision what could happen if multiple representation were allowed at the
organizational stage, consider two shareholders on friendly terms, but one in
the majority and one in a minority position. The majority shareholder could
instruct the lawyer as to the contents of the shareholders agreement, and the
minority shareholder (without proper warning and because of her trust in the
majority shareholder) may consent to these terms. 99 If the contentiousness
of negotiations is truly the test, then the lawyer would rightfully draft the
shareholders agreement to reflect the terms agreed to by the non-disputing
shareholders.
But consider a time in the future when a dispute between the sharehold-
ers may arise. The minority shareholder has suddenly lost his trust in the
majority shareholder and has become very concerned with his legal
rights. l° Imagine how the minority shareholder will react upon reviewing
determine whethcr contentious negotiations are contemplated, for multiple representation is 'plainly
impossible' in that situation").
95. See Bassett, supra note 73, at 419 ("Assuming that all of the actors share the same interests, the
attorney may decide joint representation is appropriate. However, all too frequently some inconsistency
in the clients' interests becomes apparent at a later date.").
96. Hoberman, supra note 16, at 242.
Advance planning allows the principals to have an exit strategy that may prove more profit-
able for both parties than it would be had they waited for the deadlock before addressing exit
procedures. Unfortunately, such advanced planning is not entirely simple. Principals, enthusi-
astic about engaging in a new venture, are forced to sit down and discuss the possibility of
their relationship terminating. Therefore, this part of the negotiations must be handled very
delicately ....
Id. This admittedly pessimistic view also undercuts another common rationale for joint representation in
business formation-that it keeps the discussions "positive." See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 87, at 683.
97. Many commentators improperly focus only on the contentiousness of matters at the outset of
representation without considering what may happen later. See, e.g., Charles Silver, Does Insurance
Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the Insured?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1583, 1608 (1994) ("Profes-
sional responsibility rules prohibit simultaneous representation of multiple clients only when the clients'
interests are 'fundamentally antagonistic.' Then, even informed client consent is insufficient to waive the
conflict. But the interests of companies and insureds can be and normally are harmonious at the outset of
joint representations.") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
98. See Pechersky, supra note 61, at 939.
99. For example, a majority shareholder may instruct the lawyer that all decisions made by the
shareholders require only a majority vote. The minority shareholder, believing that he and his partner
will always agree on what is best for the corporation, does not object. The minority shareholder has just
lost his voice in the corporation's management.
100. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 284.
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the shareholders agreement and realizing that all of his rights have been
bargained away! This is not meant to say that a minority shareholder is not
entitled to, and subsequently bound by, the principles of freedom of con-
tract. 10 1 Indeed, parties enter into unfavorable agreements everyday. But,
what is troubling here is that the minority shareholder probably thought his
rights were being safeguarded by the lawyer. Rights should only be bar-
gained away knowingly. Given that a potential conflict between the owners
could materialize at any time, joint representation of the owners is unadvis-
able at the organizational stage when relationships are friendly.I12
Third, Model Rule 1.7 allows joint representation until a conflict arises,
then mandates withdrawal. 10 3 While the wisdom of this structure is beyond
the scope of this Article,' ° 4 it has a serious drawback in the closely held
business context. Unique to this context, a lawyer's work during business
formation will likely dictate the result of a future conflict. In other words,
the lawyer's work product either forms the basis for, or is an integral part
of, the later dispute. Conversely, in civil litigation or criminal prosecutions,
a conflict between two co-clients likely arises over events that took place
before the lawyer was retained.
Finally, even though the above concerns are diminished if all owners
are equally business-savvy and knowledgeable about what is entailed in
forming and operating a business, this is rarely the case in practice. Even if
this is the situation, a lawyer may have difficulty determining it. In addition,
human nature must be accounted for. The lawyer likely has a stronger rela-
tionship with one owner, and that inevitably leads to favoritism. The closely
held business lawyer is usually hired at the suggestion of an owner with
whom the lawyer has a pre-existing relationship, either legal or otherwise. 1°5
The rule [of law] matters most frequently, though, when parties are ignorant of it until a dis-
pute arises; then they are bound by whatever the standard term happens to be. Many com-
mentators have argued that such ignorance is widespread and that the law of closely held cor-
porations is defective because it fails to protect ignorant investors, particularly minority
shareholders, who do not know enough to protect themselves by contract. The extent to
which minority shareholders are ignorant of problems they might face and thus fail to protect
themselves is impossible to tell.
Id. (citations omitted).
101. See Shannon Wells Stevenson, Note: The Venture Capital Solution to the Problem of Close
Corporation Shareholder Fiduciary Duties, 51 DUKE L.J. 1139, 1145 (2001) (recognizing that freedom
of contract can also benefit minority shareholders).
102. This comports with the general prohibition against representing buyers and sellers in certain
transactions. See State v. Callahan, 652 P.2d 708, 711 (Kan. 1982); Ze'-ev Eiger and Brandy Rutan,
Note, Conflicts of Interest: Attorneys Representing Parties with Adverse Interests in the Same Commer-
cial Transaction, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 945 (2001); Bassett, supra note 73, at 398-99.
[A]lthough historically it was common for an attorney to represent both parties in the transfer
of a property interest, today such a practice is usually considered improper. . . . [A] few
courts have prohibited joint representation in certain specific, recurring situations despite the
clients' informed consent. These situations include ... the representation of both buyer and
seller in real property transfers.
Id. (citations omitted).
103. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R. 1.16.
104. See generally Bassett, supra note 73.
105. See Daniel M. Filler, Lawyers in the Yellow Pages, 14 L. & LITERATURE 169, 171 (2002)
("Those who had previously hired lawyers cited personal acquaintance and recommendations of family
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The fact that this lawyer will want to maintain this relationship casts doubt
on her ability to remain impartial.1 6
If there is no pre-existing relationship, the lawyer will quickly deduce
during the course of representation which owner is "running the show."'
0 7
This person will likely be the lawyer's primary contact, the ever-important
draftsman of the lawyer's checks, and the victor in the event of an intracor-
porate dispute. Consequently, the lawyer may-intentionally or even sub-
consciously-give more time, attention and advice to this owner at the ex-
pense of the other owners, thereby exhibiting partiality.1
0 8
In sum, the lawyer will often be forced to make subtle choices favorable
to one owner and detrimental to another whenever handling an owner rela-
tionship issue."°9 It is difficult to see how a lawyer can obtain the informed
consent required to make these hard choices, or how the lawyer can make
such choices without running afoul of the "competent and diligent" repre-
sentation standard set forth in Model Rule 1.7.
C. Other Approaches Advanced By Commentators
1. Reasonable Expectations
One scholarly attempt to solve the client identity problem is drawn from
case law and looks to the "reasonable expectations" of closely held business
owners regarding personal representation. °"0 Under this approach the judi-
cial factfinder asks, "Could the constituent have reasonably expected that
the attorney for the close corporation represented him individually?""' If
answered in the affirmative, the court would find that the lawyer repre-
sented the constituent. If answered in the negative, the constituent would not
be deemed the lawyer's client. According to one commentator, most cases
are actually decided using this approach." 2
and friends as their preferred methods of attorney selection.").
106. See HAZARD ET AL., supra note 87, at 678 ("[W]hen a lawyer has a longstanding relationship
with one party and a new relationship with the other, it may be unreasonable to believe that she can be
impartial between them."); see also Mitchell, supra note 4, at 504-05 (suggesting that pre-existing
relationships with constituents bias the lawyer and thus hurt the argument for multiple representation).
107. Mitchell, supra note 4, at 505 (suggesting that lawyers will tailor their advice to more sophisti-
cated clients).
108. As Professor Mitchell correctly noted, "Even the seemingly menial task of drafting a set of
corporate by-laws requires judgments, sometimes subtle and sometimes not, allocating control among
the various parties. In such a situation the lawyer's human qualities may well lead to subtle favoritism of
one constituent over another." Id. at 473-74.
109. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 285.
On the one hand, [drafters of organizational documents] must provide some protection to mi-
nority investors to ensure that they receive an adequate return on the minority shareholder's
investment if the venture succeeds. On the other hand, they cannot give the minority too
many rights, for the minority might exercise their fights in an opportunistic fashion to claim
returns at the majority's expense.
Id.
110. See An Expectations Approach to Client Identity, supra note 39, at 691-704.
111. Id. at 688.
112. Id. at 700. At least one well known case in this area, Rosman v. Shapiro, 653 F. Supp. 1441
[Vol. 56:1:181
2004] The Everyday Problem of Client Identity 201
There are several touted benefits of this approach. First, like the aggre-
gate theory, the approach is said to promote efficiency and cost-savings in
that it allows for the representation of both the entity and one or more of its
owners. "3 Second, the approach purportedly encourages an early determina-
tion of client identity by the lawyer and a correspondingly early disclosure
of such identity to the owners. 1 4 Finally, as a standard, advocates claim that
it is by definition more flexible and "substance-seeking" than a bright-line
rule.1 15 Each of these rationales, however, is inadequate in its support of this
theory.
The efficiency and economy rationale fails here for the same reason that
it fails to support the application of the aggregate theory-that is, reasons of
efficiency and economy cannot justify the existence of an unwaivable con-
flict of interest. 1 6 There are situations when it is reasonable for multiple
owners to believe that the lawyer represents them individually. However,
this violates the conflicts of interest rules, 17 and thus cannot be the answer.
The second purported benefit of the reasonable expectations approach is
that it encourages early client determination and disclosure. Although any
rule should encourage this, the reasonable expectations approach only does
so to the extent that it provides an unworkable default rule. It entices law-
yers to specify their clients by employing a penalty default rule. I contend
that a majoritarian default rule may be more appropriate." 8
Finally, the increased flexibility of a reasonable expectation standard
does not justify its use in place of a bright-line rule. Because of the neces-
sity of a solution that can be easily understood and applied, a bright-line
rule is more appropriate than a standard." 9 Any rule should have, as a pri-
mary focus, the reduction of confusion in this area of the law. 20 Everyday
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), supports this proposition. In Rosman, the court held that "where, as here, the corpora-
tion is a close corporation consisting of only two shareholders with equal interests in the corporation, it
is indeed reasonable for each shareholder to believe that the corporate counsel is in effect his own indi-
vidual attorney." Id. at 1445. Another famous case, Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz &
Tyler, P.C., 309 N.W.2d 645, 648-49 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), could also be cited in support of the rea-
sonable expectations theory. In Fassihi, the court held that although a lawyer and shareholder do not
establish an attorney-client relationship, the lawyer may owe the shareholder fiduciary duties arising out
of their confidential relationship. Id. Professor Simon suggests that the court reached this result because
the lawyer did not clarify his role to the shareholder despite the shareholder's misunderstanding of that
role. Simon, supra note 5, at 63 n.9.
113. See An Expectations Approach to Client Identit, supra note 39, at 701-02.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 688 n. 11 (describing a substance-seeking approach as one that "attempts to discern the
substance rather than the mere form of representation").
116. See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 484 ("Reasons of economy and efficiency suggest that, where
possible, [joint] representation is desirable.") (emphasis added).
117. See supra Part lI.B.3.
118. See infra Part [l.A.2.d.
119. See infra Part mH.D.2.
120. An examination of California case law illustrates the need for clarity. See James M. Fischer,
Representing Partnerships: Who Is/Are the Client(s)?, 26 PAc. L.J. 961, 961-62 (1995) ("California
courts have held that the lawyer who is employed by a partnership represents (1) the partnership, or
alternatively (2) the partnership and the general partners, or alternatively (3) the partnership, the general
partners and the limited partners. The decisions are difficult to reconcile.") (citations omitted).
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lawyers must be able to apply the rule, and even more importantly, clients
must be able to understand it.
2. Framework of Dealing
Professor William Simon focused on entity representation in a recent ar-
ticle. 12' After an excellent discussion and critique of the many existing theo-
ries, he proposed a new way of viewing the entity-as a "framework of
dealing." Professor Simon suggested that the "duly authorized constituents"
approach taken by Model Rule 1.13 is incomplete. He believes that
whether a person, body (e.g., board of directors), or decision is authorized in
any given matter is often ambiguous, and thus cannot be properly addressed
by a lawyer until she examines the merits of the particular matter.' 23 If the
lawyer cannot determine the merits of a dispute, the lawyer should remain
neutral. 1
24
I believe this theory can be viewed in one of two ways. First, it can be
seen as embracing the entity theory, but attempting to solve a common
problem that arises-the question of authorization. Second, it can be viewed
more expansively as proposing a substantively new role for the lawyer as
businessperson in addition to legal counselor. Supporting the second view,
Professor Simon argues that the entity "has an interest in the fair treatment
of its constituents," 125 and that lawyers owe duties to those constituents who
are correct in their positions on any given issue. 126 He concedes that
"[s]ome will be disturbed by the notion that the lawyer has responsibility for
determining the merits of an intracorporate dispute."'
127
This is indeed a troublesome proposition. The lawyer's expertise is not
in making business decisions, and the Model Rules explicitly discourage
this role for the lawyer. 128 Consider the consequences of requiring lawyers
to make business decisions-in effect making them part of the entity's man-
agement (by facilitating the cause of the owner whose position the lawyer
sees as more meritorious). If we begin down this road, we may subject law-
yers to even greater potential confusion-and liability-than they now
121. Simon, supra note 5, at 86-89.
122. Id. at 86-87.
123. Id. at 87.
124. Id. Simon notes:
Of course, in many, perhaps even most, situations, the lawyer will not be able to determine
reliably the substantive merits. In these circumstances, the Framework of Dealing approach
favors neutrality. With respect to the conflict-of-interest issue, this means that the lawyer
cannot speak for any of the disputing constituents.
Id.
125. Id at 86.
126. Id at 87 ("[Tlhe lawyer might resolve [a] conflict-of-interest issue by aligning herself with the
constituent who had the more meritorious claim.").
127. Id. at 89,
128. The Model Rules provide that "[w]hen constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the
decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Deci-
sions concerning policy and operations, including ones entailing serious risk, are not as such in the
lawyer's province." MODEL RULES, supra note 22, at R. 1.13 cmt. 3.
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face. 129 The goal should be to clarify representation for both lawyers and
clients, even if such a solution will sometimes sacrifice the optimal result
for the sake of clarity.
130
Further, assuming lawyers did try to become judges of these disputes,
they would often have difficulty determining their merits, and thus could
not advise on these matters.131 Professor Simon concedes this problem.
32
This is especially true in the organizational stage, where the lawyer proba-
bly has limited familiarity with both the skills of the owners and the entity's
new business plan. There have been no results generated by either owner for
the new business at that time. Therefore, one owner's argument that a right
of first refusal provision should be drafted his way may merits no more con-
sideration than an opposing claim from the other owner. 3 3 Compounding
the lack of operating history is the plethora of arguments for benefiting a
majority owner or, conversely, protecting a minority owner no matter who
they are. Thus, in the organizational context, the merits are simply too diffi-
cult for lawyers to judge. But this would mean a lawyer could never prepare
organizational documents for an entity, which clearly cannot be an accept-
able result. 34 The framework of dealing approach does not adequately solve
the client identity problem in the closely held business context.
III. A NEW PROPOSAL: THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL DISTINCTION
The preceding discussion reveals the deficiencies of the current rules
and theories concerning representation of closely held businesses. In sum-
mary, the entity theory-under which the lawyer represents the entity
only-guides the lawyer when representing the entity opposite third parties,
but provides no guidance on how to resolve conflicts between the entity's
owners. The aggregate theory, which claims that the lawyer represents the
entity and all of its individual owners, too often creates impermissible con-
flicts of interest. The reasonable expectations approach is only useful in
129. See Bethany Smith, Note, Sitting On vs. Sitting In On Your Client's Board of Directors, 15 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 597 (2002) (discussing the greater potential liability for the corporate lawyer who sits
on his client's board of directors).
130. See infra Part 11.D.2.
131. Simon, supra note 5, at 89 (noting the framework of dealing approach may not be useful "as a
practical guide to professional responsibility decisions").
132. Id. ("Some will think [the lawyer] will so seldom be able to make such a judgment that the
approach will require neutrality too often.").
133. I argue elsewhere that the lawyer usually has a pre-existing relationship with at least one owner.
See 3upru note 105 and accompanying text. Although this may enable the lawyer to make an educated
guess as to this owner's ability to run the new business, there would be no equally reliable means of
determining the other owner's (or owners') skill and knowledge, and thus no means for a meaningful
comparison.
134. See Simon, supra note 5, at 87. He argues that, in such a situation, the joint representation and
the framework of dealing approaches will both require withdrawal from representation in certain circum-
stances, but for different reasons: "The joint-representation perspective requires withdrawal because the
lawyer cannot adequately represent all individuals and cannot represent any of them individually without
jeopardizing duties of confidentiality and loyalty to the others. The Framework of Dealing approach
requires withdrawal because the client's interests cannot be determined." Id.
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hindsight, and the framework of dealing approach improperly calls on law-
yers to become the judges of business disputes.
My proposed solution first divides the world of the closely held busi-
ness lawyer into "internal" and "external" matters. 35 In short, internal mat-
ters involve the inner workings of the entity and, in particular, the needs and
concerns of the entity's owners. External matters relate to the entity's deal-
ings with the outside world. This classification recognizes a key difference
between closely held businesses and traditional corporations: because own-
ers of closely held businesses often do not distinguish their interests from
the entity's interests, internal matters take on significant importance in
closely held businesses. Stated differently, unlike in traditional corporations,
the closely held business lawyer is counselor to both the entity and its own-
ers. Once the lawyer's world is divided to reflect these two distinct roles,
she can establish her internal client-an owner136-and her external client-
the corporation.' 37 The lawyer is then ready to undertake representation
generally free from conflict.
13 8
A. Internal Matters
1. Internal Matters Defined
Internal matters are everything that happens "inside" the entity.139 There
are several categories of internal matters. The first, and the category that
creates the conflicts of interest that my proposed approach seeks to elimi-
nate, involves the business relationships between owners (what I have been
135. See Richard A. Epstein, Contract and Trust in Corporate Law: The Case of Corporate Oppor-
tunity, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 7 (1996).
Most of a corporation's affairs can be divided into two large categories: the first of these
deals with the external relationships of the corporation to the rest of the world; and the second
deals with the internal affairs of the corporation, i.e., the way in which the corporate partici-
pants-shareholders, directors, officers, and perhaps bondholders and contractual creditors-
organize their cooperative venture among themselves ....
Id.
136. A related idea, that representation of one co-client against another in a later dispute should be
permissible, has been suggested by Professor Richard Painter. Richard W. Painter, Advance Waiver of
Conflicts, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 289, 323 (2000). ("Co-clients should . . . be permitted to agree ex-
ante that their lawyer may subsequently represent one of the clients in the matter, or in another substan-
tially related matter, even if an adverse interest among the clients later emerges.").
137. Ideally this is done via a retainer agreement from the outset of representation. Realizing that
lawyers and clients will not always enter into such agreements, however, suggestions for a default rule
are also provided. See infra Part IIl.A.2.d.
138. See infra Part L.C for the limited circumstances under which a lawyer must withdraw or face
disqualification under my proposed theory.
139. See Pechersky, supra note 61, at 924 n.16 (defining a corporation's "internal affairs" as "matters
peculiar to the relationships among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and
shareholders") (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982)); Dale A. Oesterle, Subcurrents
in LLC Statutes: Limiting the Discretion of State Courts to Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small
Business, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 881, 893 (1995) (suggesting that drafters of LLC statutes sought to in-
crease "the flexibility and autonomy of firm participants in ordering, free from court restructuring, their
firms' internal affairs through the firms' constitutional documents").
The Everyday Problem of Client Identity
referring to as "owner relationship issues"). 140 These are the owners' per-
sonal interests in the venture-each owner's expectations for the venture in
relation to the others.' 4' The ownership stakes and management positions of
the owners are examples of this type of internal matter. Because many such
items are addressed in a shareholders agreement, the lawyer represents her
internal client during its preparation. As discussed earlier, 142 these matters
present impermissible conflicts because they put owners in adverse, or at
least potentially adverse, positions.
The second category of internal matters relates to the internal operations
of the entity. These are the internal mechanisms by which the entity func-
tions. For example, the preparation of corporate bylaws is an internal matter
because bylaws divide decision-making duties among shareholders, direc-
tors, and officers. This document establishes who is authorized to act on
behalf of the corporation on any given matter."'3
The third category of internal matters is the catch all-if no third party
has a direct interest in a matter, it is by default internal to the entity.' 4 De-
termining whether a third party has a direct interest requires elaboration.
Third parties may be indirectly affected by internal matters, but the owners
or the entity will be the ones primarily affected. For example, all third par-
ties who may potentially wish to buy an existing shareholder's stock have
an indirect interest in how a right of first refusal provision is drafted. 45 The
more difficult such a provision makes it for a remaining shareholder to ex-
ercise her right of first refusal, the better it is for the third party seeking to
become a shareholder. But because these third parties have no control over
how this provision is drafted, it is properly defined as an internal matter.
(When an existing right of first refusal provision is triggered, however, the
third party becomes an integral player in the transaction and thus the matter
becomes external.)
The purpose of defining a matter as internal or external is to separate
the two distinct roles that the closely held business lawyer plays. Once this
has been accomplished, the lawyer can represent a separate "client" for each
type of matter. Establishing the external client is simple-it is always the
entity. 146 But, establishing the internal client, and ensuring that all of the
140. See, e.g., Pechersky, supra note 61, at 924 (discussing "representation solely concern[ing] the
internal affairs of the individuals operating the business") (citation omitted).
141. The owners' relative interests can be implicated in choices concerning "organizational form[,]..
• capital structure, corporate finance, control mechanisms, [and] organic transactions." Mitchell, supra
note 4, at 484.
142. See supra Part 1l.B.3.
143. See infra Part HI.B.3.
144. There is significant overlap between these categories. For example, an employment agreement
between a shareholder and the corporation qualifies as internal because it relates to the internal workings
of the corporation-the corporation is employing a constituent to perform certain tasks. It is also internal
simply because it is not external-it does not relate to a corporation's interaction with a third party.
145. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
146. See infra Part flI.B.2.
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owners understand the ramifications of this, is the biggest practical chal-
lenge in applying this theory.
2. Establishing the Internal Client
a. When to Establish the Internal Client
For many closely held business lawyers, representation begins at the
beginning-with the formation of the entity. In the typical scenario, the
lawyer will be approached by one or more individuals, who will correctly
believe that incorporation is advisable to protect their personal assets from
being used to satisfy business debts.147 The individuals will discuss with the
lawyer, among other things, the form of entity that will produce the most
favorable tax result and the preparation of documents that will establish the
terms of the business relationship between the individuals as owners. As
discussed earlier, 148 it is at this early stage that conflicts between the owners
are a concern, and it is because of these potential conflicts that the lawyer
should specify the identity of her internal client at this stage.
Internal matters will arise predominantly in the organizational stages,
but can also arise if the lawyer undertakes representation after the entity has
commenced operations. For example, if the co-founders of the entity have a
dispute over the future of the business and one or both want to examine
their options for parting ways, they may approach the lawyer for strategic
advice. If the lawyer has been representing the entity from the beginning,
she will have already established which of the co-founders she represents
(and, therefore, to whom the lawyer should provide the requested advice). If
the lawyer undertook representation after the governing documents were
adopted and operations had commenced, then perhaps the identity of the
internal client has not yet been established (because no internal matters have
yet arisen). 149
Two possibilities present themselves for the lawyer's handling of this
situation. First, if providing the requested advice involves merely determin-
ing the founders' rights under the entity's existing governing documents,
then perhaps the lawyer can provide this advice without establishing an in-
ternal client. However, it may be argued (fairly, I think), that a lawyer's
reading of these documents is different from a layperson' s reading. Just as I
am skeptical that a lawyer can act as a scrivener for the parties and docu-
ment their agreement without encountering a conflict of interest, I seriously
doubt that a lawyer can merely read and recite a legal document's con-
tents.150 Any such exercise involves the lawyer's skill and expertise in inter-
147. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
149. In contrast, internal matters always arise during organization, and thus the internal client must
be established at the outset of any representation undertaken at this stage.
150. See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 483 (suggesting that a lawyer acting as a "mere scrivener" is
neither possible nor responsible).
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preting such documents and devising a creative strategy based on a combi-
nation of discrete provisions.1 5 ' My skepticism is supported by common
sense-if the lawyer is merely to read and recite existing documents, why
would the clients, who could do this themselves, pay a lawyer's fees for this
task?
The more appropriate course of action would be for the lawyer to iden-
tify the internal client at this stage. Of course, doing so probably involves
tipping off the other owner that the first owner's intentions have become
adverse. It also likely aligns the lawyer with one owner at the expense of the
lawyer's relationship with the other.15 2 But regardless of these difficulties, it
is still the advisable course of action because it avoids conflicts of interests
and saves the lawyer from potential liability to an owner who had reason-
able expectations of being represented.
1 5 3
As is implicit in the above discussion, a lawyer may represent only the
entity (i.e., not have an internal client) under limited circumstances if the
lawyer was retained post-organization. It is very common for entities to hire
lawyers for discrete purposes, such as for business combinations or litiga-
tion matters. The lawyer must only establish an internal client if an internal
matter presents itself. It is important to reassert that every dispute among
owners is not an internal matter. If the dispute concerns a decision relating
to the entity's business and not the business relationship between the own-
ers, it is purely an external matter and the lawyer takes her direction from
the entity's duly authorized constituents.154
b. How to Establish the Internal Client
The identity of the internal client should be established in a retainer
agreement signed by the lawyer and all of the entity's owners. An explicit
agreement is not required to establish client identity (course of conduct can
suffice), and the agreement does not have to be written 155 (unless to satisfy
consent to a concurrent client conflict under Model Rule 1.7). But, because
of the confusion over client identity in this area and its significant conse-
quences, I submit that a detailed, written agreement clarifying representa-
tion is far better than relying on an oral agreement or course of conduct.1
5 6
The retainer agreement should be signed by all owners and should ex-
plain three things: (1) the internal-external distinction and how it will guide
the lawyer's representation;1 57 (2) which owner is the lawyer's internal cli-
151. See George D. Gopen, The State of Legal Writing: Res Ipsa Loquitur, 86 MICH. L. REV. 333,
352 (1987) ("[Tlhe non-lawyer cannot interpret the law, or the lawyer's document.").
152. But see infra note 159.
153. See supra Part n.C. 1.
154. See infra Part llI.B.3.
155. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 83, § 14.
156. See Lawrence A. Dubin, Client Beware: The Need for a Mandatory Written Fee Agreement
Rule, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 93 (1998) (advocating written retainer agreements, and in particular written fee
arrangements).
157. This statement should be written in a way that laypersons with little experience dealing with
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ent, and that the lawyer will provide advice on internal matters to that owner
and draft internal documents per that owner's instructions; and (3) that the
lawyer advises the non-represented owner (or owners) to seek separate
counsel, particularly if the non-represented owner is in a minority owner-
ship position.15  The non-represented owner may or may not choose to seek
separate counsel, but at least this owner will not be proceeding under the
fiction that the organizational documents necessarily protect his interests. 1
59
Often the non-represented owner will choose not to retain separate
counsel, and the represented owner will instruct the lawyer to be "flexible"
and "fair" when drafting shareholders' agreements and other internal docu-
ments. t6° Even in this situation, which is the same practical result provided
by the aggregate theory (one lawyer being primarily responsible for all ad-
vice and drafting all documents), the conflict of interest problems have been
satisfactorily resolved because the lawyer does not represent all of the own-
ers.
16 1
c. Clearly Aligned Owners
My proposed approach centers around avoiding conflicts of interest be-
tween individual owners. This usually means that only one owner can be the
lawyer's internal client, or else potential conflicts are a concern. 162 But
when two or more owners are "clearly aligned," these owners can all be the
lawyer's internal clients and conflicts are not a concern. What constitutes
clear alignment is a high standard. Simply that the interests of two owners
are not presently in conflict is not sufficient, 163 and neither is the fact that
lawyers can understand.
158. A brief statement warning of the general risks of being a minority owner should suffice. It is not
the lawyer's job to advise the minority owner any further if this owner is not the lawyer's internal client.
159. This Article attempts to develop a solution for lawyers representing closely held businesses that
reflects reality yet ensures that lawyers abide by their ethical duties. Part of reflecting reality is acknowl-
edging that while certainly not "leaders" of the entities they represent, lawyers for small businesses are
often more than legal counsel. They are also confidants and friends. See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 481
(stating a closely held business lawyer functions as "initiator, planner, and advisor to the close corpora-
tion regarding governance, finance, and the long-range planning of its operations"). Leadership theory
attempts to determine which characteristic of a leader will maximize the good of the organization. It has
been recognized that leaders who focus on their relationship with their subordinates, and therefore score
high on "consideration" qualities, are the most effective leaders. See GEORGE F. WIELAND,
ORGANIZATIONS, BEHAVIOR, DESIGN, AND CHANGE, 351 fig. 12-5 (1976). The most effective leaders
produce the best results for the organization. Id. Thus, to the extent the closely held business lawyers can
be viewed as leaders, facilitating a positive relationship with owners would help the entity achieve its
goals. Specifying that the lawyer represents one owner, and not the others, could be said to polarize
relations between the lawyer and the non-represented owners. But I submit that being upfront and avoid-
ing confusion establishes the terms of the relationship and even respect for the lawyer, and lays the
proper framework within which a positive relationship can develop.
160. See Oesterle, supra note 139, at 879 (opining that market constraints, such as the majority
shareholder earning a bad reputation by mistreating the minority, will dictate a fairer course of conduct
by the majority shareholder).
161. It would be difficult for a non-represented owner to have reasonable expectations of being
represented individually if a lawyer complies with the steps I have outlined.
162. See supra Part I.B.3.
163. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
The Everyday Problem of Client Identity
the owners currently have common business goals for the entity. Clearly
aligned owners are either: (1) essentially the same person (and any distinc-
tion is form over substance) or (2) have a common identity (when compared
to other owners). Both of these situations are explained below.
To explain what is meant by two owners being essentially the same per-
son, consider a common estate planning technique: some of an individual's
shares are held personally, and some are held by his family trust. The indi-
vidual places shares in the trust's name as a means of wealth succession and
to establish who will manage the business upon his death.' 64 Technically
these are two shareholders, but they are really the same interests (the indi-
vidual shareholder is often the trustee of the family trust and makes deci-
sions on its behalf).
To illustrate the second category of clearly aligned owners, imagine two
families going into business together. They decide to form a corporation for
purposes of their joint venture. Each family group's stock will be held by
multiple members of the family. In this situation, because negotiations will
primarily occur between the two families, as opposed to between members
of the same family, the internal client can be one family group. The lawyer
should ask one member of the family group to be the representative from
that group for purposes of instructing the lawyer. Of course, it is still possi-
ble for conflicts to arise within the family group, and therefore the rationale
for allowing joint representation of these clients is not as persuasive as in
the first category.
d. Considerations for the Default Rule
One of the main tenets of my argument is that lawyers should identify
their clients at the outset of representation. This avoids confusion, negates
the reasonableness of owner expectations that do not reflect the lawyer's
expectations, and allows for the recognition and proper handling of any
conflicts of interest that may arise. But not all lawyers will do what they
should. They may not prepare a retainer agreement, and even if they do,
these agreements may not adequately explain the internal-external distinc-
tion or may be unclear in other respects.1
65
Recognizing these practical problems, a default rule for identifying the
internal client may be desirable.'6 An obvious choice for the internal client
is the majority owner, if there is one, as he speaks for the entity by virtue of
this position. 167 Minority owners usually take a back seat to majority owners
164. See Jay A. Soled, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Resolving Transfer Tax Controversies, 42 B.C. L.
REV. 587, 604 (2001) ("When taxpayers attempt to transfer [business enterprise] wealth, they often have
another agenda item in mind, namely business continuity.").
165. Although this would likely be attorney error, retainer agreements are general in nature and thus
cannot adequately cover all scenarios that may arise.
166. See Fischer, supra note 120, at 980 (discussing "the problem of what the default rule should be
when the parties have failed to address the issue" of client identity in a retainer agreement).
167. Such a rule is a "majoritarian" default rule in that it provides for what a majority of clients
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in managing the business. Consequently, minority owners have fewer inter-
actions with the entity's lawyer and thus less of an expectation that the law-
yer represents them personally. In addition, because majority owners usu-
ally make decisions for the entity even prior to its formation, there is a good
chance that the majority owner chose the lawyer based on a pre-existing
relationship or referral.1 68 Therefore, if there is a majority owner, and absent
extenuating circumstances (explained below), a supportable default rule
would be that the majority owner is the lawyer's internal client.1
6 1
If there is no majority owner (for example, three equal owners), then
any default rule should look primarily to the extenuating circumstances.
These include, in no particular order: which, if any, owner had a pre-
existing relationship with the lawyer; which owner hired the lawyer; and
whether the lawyer's conduct implied personal representation of any of the
owners. 170 In my experience, the extenuating circumstances will usually
strongly suggest that a particular owner is the lawyer's internal client.
B. External Matters
1. External Matters Defined
External matters relate to the entity's interactions with third parties-in
other words, when the entity interacts with the outside world. When lawyers
assist with external matters, they are helping the entity to facilitate its daily
business. Drafting and negotiating manufacturing and supply agreements,
acquisition agreements, and agreements to license software are examples of
external matters. Representing an entity during fundraising is also an exter-
nal matter. For example, a corporation may decide to create and sell pre-
ferred stock to investors. The lawyer could represent the corporation on all
such matters, including drafting the prospectus and investor documents re-
lating to the sale of the preferred stock.'7 ' Assisting an entity in litigation is
also usually external.
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would contract for in this position. See Painter, supra note 136, at 290-91. It could be argued that be-
cause there is such a great advantage for both lawyers and clients for ex ante determination of client
identity, a "penalty" default rule (e.g., that the lawyer owes duties to all individual owners) is more
appropriate. See id.
168. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
169. See Fischer, supra note 120, at 987 ("[T]he presumption, if a presumption is needed, should be
that the lawyer represents the constituents who speak for the entity.").
170. See id. at 963 (suggesting that "in the absence of a retainer expressly identifying the client(s),
the lawyer's clients are determined by the relationship the lawyer has in fact with the putative clients and
the reasonable expectations which arise out of that relationship").
171. In theory, the corporation may sell a majority of its stock and thus a controlling interest to out-
side investors (referred to as a "change of control"). In such a situation, the internal client would not
change (unless of course that client was bought out by the outside investors), but now the investors
would control the corporation and thus have the ultimate say in how the lawyer proceeds on external
matters.
172. An obvious exception is when the litigation is between the entity and the internal client.
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2. Entity as External Client
The entity is always the lawyer's external client. There is nothing novel
about this-the entity is the lawyer's client under both the Model Rules and
the aggregate theory. It is also a major reason business owners retain coun-
sel-to represent the entity in the legal aspects of its business. The lawyer
should make clear to all owners that the entity is the lawyer's external cli-
ent, again preferably in writing, at the outset of representation. 173 Although
it is conceivable that the would-be owners could employ the lawyer simply
for internal matters, it will be uncommon for the business's main lawyer not
to also represent the entity on some kind of external matter.
3. Duly Authorized Constituents Revisited
After specifying to all owners that the entity is the lawyer's external cli-
ent, the lawyer must explain to the owners how she will receive instructions
to act on behalf of the entity. We need look no further than Model Rule 1.13
to find the answer-lawyers should take their direction from the entity's
"duly authorized constituents."' 174 Usually a corporation's articles of incor-
poration, bylaws and other governing documents delineate its management
structure. 1 5 Therefore, the lawyer need only refer to these documents
(which she may or may not have drafted depending on when she undertook
representation) to determine whose authorization she needs to proceed on a
particular matter. 176 For example, for a merger of the corporation, a majority
vote of the shareholders will most likely be required, whereas entering into
a routine contract with a software provider can usually be done by the cor-
poration's president acting alone.'
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173. See infra Part IV. For the suggestion that the board of directors, rather than the abstract "entity,"
should be the lawyer's client, see Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism, Legal
Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley § 307, MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
174. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 22, at R. 1 13. But see Simon, supra note5, at 81-83 (noting it is
sometimes difficult to determine proper authorities).
175. Although close corporation statutes in a majority of states permit close corporations to operate
without boards of directors, the duties are simply vested in other individualg. See HAMILTON, supra note
36, at 476.
The [close corporation] statutes of about 30 states permit the authority normally placed in the
board of directors to be vested in other persons or organizations by an appropriate provision
in the articles of incorporation (or in some instances for some types of provisions, in the by-
laws). Many of these statutes also provide that if managerial authority is vested in persons or
organizations other than the board of directors, those persons or organizations then have the
duties, responsibilities, and liabilities of directors.
Id. Partnerships and limited liability companies will also have defined management structures. For
example, general partners typically make decisions for limited partnerships, and members (the owners)
and managers are vested with decision-making responsibilities in limited liability companies,
176. This view, the entity as its "authority structure," is one of three possible views of entity repre-
sentation discussed by Professor Simon. For support and criticism of this and the other two views-
entity as "control group" and entity as "framework of dealing"-see Simon, supra note 5, at 75-103. See
also supra Part IlC.2 for further discussion of the framework of dealing view.
177. To further illustrate, the bylaws may give the president of a corporation the authority to execute
contracts with third parties involving amounts under $5,000 without the approval of the board of direc-
tors. In this case, if the president instructs the lawyer to draft such a contract, the lawyer should proceed
2004]
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If the governing documents do not specify the duly authorized represen-
tatives to instruct the lawyer, the lawyer should look to the default rules.
These are the statutes and case law of the entity's state of incorporation,
which specify in general terms the powers and duties of the entity's owners
and managers vis-A-vis each other. These rules will also specify certain de-
cisions that are traditionally within the provinces of the owners and manag-
ers. 178 Lawyers should be cognizant that some of these rules cannot be
modified, and that they will control even if the entity's governing docu-
ments provide otherwise.
179
C. When the Interests of the Internal and External Clients Conflict
Under my proposed approach, lawyers must only withdraw from repre-
sentation or face disqualification when the interests of their internal and
external clients conflict. Because internal and external matters are substan-
tially different in nature and thus do not commonly overlap, these conflicts
should be few and far between. But, they do occur.
The interests of internal and external clients will conflict mostly on in-
ternal matters. For example, preparing an employment agreement for the
lawyer's internal client is an internal matter-it involves the internal opera-
tions of the entity. 180 Yet, this is a contract between the lawyer's internal
and external clients, and their interests at least potentially conflict. To illus-
trate this conflict, imagine that the employment agreement prevents the em-
ployee from competing with the entity after his employment ends-a com-
mon provision. This benefits the entity by enticing a key constituent to
remain, but harms the owner by restricting his future employment options.
A later dispute between the owner and the corporation over the interpreta-
tion of such a provision would likewise present a conflict of interest for the
lawyer. Conversely, preparing an employment agreement for a non-
represented owner, while still an internal matter, does not present a conflict.
The lawyer represents only one client-the entity-in this matter.
Conflicts of interest can also arise on external matters. What if the law-
yer's internal client disagrees with the other owners on whether the entity
should purchase a piece of investment property? This is an external matter
with this task (which is an external matter) even if the president is not the lawyer's internal client.
178. But see supra note 175 (close corporation statutes allow some manipulation of traditional gov-
ernance statutes),
179. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (2001) (stating that the sale of substantially all of a corpo-
ration's assets must be authorized "by a resolution adopted by the holders of a majority of the out-
standing stock of the corporation"); Chapin v. Benwood Found., Inc., 402 A.2d 1205, 1210 (Del. Ch.
1979) ("[D]irectors of a Delaware corporation may not delegate to others those duties which lay at the
heart of the management of the corporation.").
180. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. It is also internal because no third party has a direct
interest in the matter. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
181. See Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The Current Judicial
Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-A Proposal for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 531,
532 (1984).
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because it involves the entity's external business. If the internal client is not
in the majority and thus does not speak for the entity, then the interests of
the internal client and the entity conflict. The lawyer cannot assist with the
matter unless both parties give informed consent to the co-representation.
82
Whether, and to what extent, the same problems with informed consent and
compromising of a lawyer's duty of loyalty are involved in such waivers
will be left for another day (although under my analysis the lawyer may
well be advised to decline participation in such tasks).
D. Policy and Practical Considerations Furthered by the New Proposal
1. Multiple Representation Promotes Efficiency and Economy
Both the aggregate theory and my proposed rule allow multiple repre-
sentation of closely held businesses. The main difference is that the aggre-
gate theory proposes "true" multiple representation-one lawyer represents
multiple clients on the same matter. My theory also allows for multiple re-
spresentation, but in a different sense-multiple clients with related identi-
ties (an owner and the entity) are represented, but on different matters (in-
ternal and external matters). In this case, different is better-the benefits of
true multiple representation are retained, without its problems. My theory is
still a complete theory of firm representation.
Proponents of the aggregate theory argue that multiple representation is
more efficient and economical than hiring multiple lawyers for the entity
and its owners.'8 3 From a practical perspective, both of these arguments are
persuasive. In my experience, in matters as routine and non-time intensive
as business organization, one lawyer should take a leadership position. Not
only is one lawyer more efficient at performing the tasks because she is the
conduit for all information, but the owners, who are often short on available
funds at start-up, prefer one lawyer to keep legal costs down.1
84
No reasons of efficiency or economy, however, can justify a violation
of lawyers' ethical duties of zealous representation and loyalty to their cli-
ents. 18' The aggregate theory has been shown to cause such violations.' 86
Furthermore, the aggregate theory forces a lawyer's withdrawal or disquali-
182. If it is clear that the internal client has no legal basis to object to the majority owner's decision,
this objection can be viewed as frivolous and the lawyer may elect to proceed with the matter. But be-
cause there will usually be some plausible grounds for the objection (and simply out of caution), the
lawyer should be wary of this course of conduct.
183. See Mitchell, supra note 4, at 484 ("Reasons of economy and efficiency suggest that, where
possible, [multiple] representation is desirable.").
184. See John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple Clients in
the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REv. 741, 747 (1992) ("Parties who seek to enter into a
transaction or resolve a dispute often demand that one lawyer represent the interest of multiple clients for
several reasons. In most cases, clients wish to minimize the cost of legal representation by engaging only
one lawyer.").
185. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
186. See supra Part ll.B.3.
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fication whenever a dispute between owners arises. 187 Then, all efficiency
and cost-savings justifications are turned on their heads, for the one lawyer
who is familiar with the owners and their issues can no longer represent any
of them. 188 So, unless there are no disputes involving owner relationship
issues during an entity's existence-an unlikely scenario-the aggregate
theory produces more situations requiring disqualification, and thus more
expense for the owners, than another arrangement might. 189 Any proposed
improvement in the ethical rules should allow for some form of multiple
representation, and thus increased efficiency and economy for clients, while
resulting in fewer disqualifications than the current rules require.
The internal-external distinction does just that. First, it does allow for
multiple representation-both an owner (or a clearly aligned group of own-
ers) and the entity itself are the lawyer's clients. The non-represented own-
ers are urged to retain a lawyer to safeguard their interests, but are not re-
quired to. Thus, one lawyer will usually still be responsible for most of the
work for the entity and its owners. Even if a non-represented owner chooses
to retain separate counsel, the separate counsel will not be forced to dupli-
cate the work of the entity's lawyer. This lawyer would most likely limit her
representation to a review of the organizational documents and an analysis
of areas where the rights of her client should be increased, or she might be-
come involved if a specific dispute involving her client arises.
Internal clients may favor the internal-external rule because they do not
automatically lose confidentiality and attorney-client privilege as between
the other owners. 19 Of course, these theoretical benefits may be of limited
practical use because relevant information relating to the business may find
its way to the other owners through partnership and corporate law con-
cepts.191
187. See Bassett, supra note 73, at 435-36 ("[I1f the clients' interests diverge, the attorney is subject
to disqualification and must withdraw-usually causing both financial and tactical hardship for the
clients, and potentially resulting in a malpractice claim or disciplinary charges against the lawyer.");
HAZARD & HODES, supra note 29, § 17.3 ("In the face of an irreconcilable conflict of interest under the
group theory, the lawyer would no doubt be forced to cease representing any member of the group,
including the entity itself.").
188. See Bassett, supra note 73, at 437 ("ITIhe primary justification for joint representation from the
clients' perspective-the cost savings-is overshadowed by the burden that will fall on the clients if the
attorney is subsequently required to withdraw.").
189. Efficiency and expense are interrelated. New lawyers who must familiarize themselves with
clients and their affairs must spend more time, and thus charge higher fees, than a client's existing law-
yer would. See id. at 436-37 ("The lawyer's withdrawal requires each client to retain individual counsel,
resulting in duplication of effort and expense for both clients. The original lawyer's work product usu-
ally cannot be delivered to substitute counsel .... ") (citations omitted). Some lawyers may adjust the
client's bill to "write-off' this time, but in my experience this is by no means the universal practice.
190. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 75-76 and accompanying text.
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2. Bright-Line Rule Gives Definitive Guidance
Whether a bright-line rule or a flexible standard is appropriate must
generally be determined on an issue-by-issue basis. 192 The general argument
is that bright-line rules are more appropriate when the need for predictabil-
ity, uniformity, and stability outweigh the need for flexibility and considera-
tion of individual circumstances.193 Although bright-line rules may over-
include or under-include, 194 they sometimes produce better results than sub-
jective standards.' 95
Both closely held business lawyers and their clients may prefer the pre-
dictability of a bright-line rule as to client identity. 96 Lawyers must know
the identities of their clients from the outset; otherwise they cannot repre-
sent them zealously or maintain their confidences. The existence of these
duties is predicated upon the existence of an attorney-client relationship.
The client also benefits from a bright-line rule because any unreasonable
expectations of personal representation are removed at the outset.'9 7 Con-
versely, the use of a reasonable expectation standard requires an examina-
tion of all facts surrounding the representation after they have transpired. In
other words, this approach fails to offer prospective guidance to a lawyer
attempting to determine client identity.'98
My proposed approach utilizes a bright-line rule to the extent possible.
First, there will be no circumstances that change the fact that a closely held
business lawyer has one internal client and one external client.' 99 In other
words, a judge would never be permitted to find that the entity was the law-
192. For an in-depth discussion of rules and standards, see Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33
UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985).
193. See id. at 400. Compare Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69 (1927) (Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes holding that drivers approaching a railroad crossing "stop and look" before
proceeding) with Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 100 (1934) (Justice Benjamin Cardozo, consider-
ing the same facts, delivered opinion establishing a standard whereby all circumstances must be consid-
ered).
194. But see Einer Elhauge, The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine, 59 U. CHI. L. REV.
1465, 1497 (1992) (at times "the greater error in applying [a] ... standard means that the bright-line rule
will result in less over- and under-deterrence").
195. Professor Robert Summers discusses the appropriateness of bright-line rules versus subjective
standards in the context of legal formality. See Robert S. Summers, The Place of Form in the Fundamen-
tals of Law, 14 RATIo JuRIS 106, 119 (2001). He argues that a precise speed limit rule (e.g., 65
miles/hour) is more appropriate than a rule requiring drivers to "drive reasonably." The precise rule
promotes highway safety and efficient traffic flow because its "simplicity, definiteness, and complete-
ness generate more determinative guidance and thus clearer formal reasons for actions by drivers." Id.
196. See Fischer, supra note 120, at 985 ("Because the consequences of client misidentification [in
the entity context] can be severe, both to the lawyer and the 'clients,' there is a temptation to prefer a
'rules' approach over ease-by-case analysis.").
197. Id. at 962 ("It is hard to be an effective advocate when the identity of the client will be deter-
mined after the fact based on issues yet to be determined.").
198. But see Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1943 (1998) ("Optimal Formulation of corporate law involves a tradeoff between
predictability and flexibility. Reaching the best result in an individual case may come at the expense of
providing the business community with sufficient guidance for future planning.").
199. But see supra text accompanying note 154 for the limited circumstances under which the lawyer
may represent only the entity.
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yer's only client, or that the lawyer represented all of the owners.2 ° Second,
the external client is always the entity.201 Third, this approach views closely
held business representation in a manner that reflects reality and thus can be
understood by ordinary lawyers. This will make it easier for these lawyers
to do what they should-specify their internal clients at the outset of repre-
sentation. 20 2 This would, in effect, be a bright-line rule; if the lawyer names
her internal client and all owners agree, no circumstances will change that.
Finally, if the lawyer does not specify an internal client but there is a major-
ity owner, a bright-line rule default rule could be that the majority owner is
the internal client.20 3 But, if the lawyer does not specify the internal client,
and if there is no majority owner, then it becomes necessary to consider
individual circumstances. 2° 4 Unlike the general reasons for finding a major-
ity owner to be the lawyer's internal client, a lack of commonality between
individual cases would not support a bright-line rule where there is no ma-
205jority owner.
IV. THE PROPOSED RULE: REPRESENTATION OF
CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES
I suggest adding the following rule to the Model Rules to govern repre-
sentation of closely held businesses. Similar rules should be added to the
Model Code and any hybrid of the Model Rules or Model Code adopted by
any state (revised to accord with the existing terminology).20 6 This rule
would not replace any of the existing rules, but would take precedence for
representation of closely held businesses. The proposed Model Rule is as
follows:
REPRESENTATION OF CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES
When a lawyer undertakes representation of a "Closely Held Busi-
ness," the lawyer shall represent no more than one owner, or one
clearly aligned group of owners, and shall always represent the en-
tity. A "Closely Held Business" is a corporation, partnership, lim-
200. See Bassett, supra note 73, at 457 (arguing that a bright-line prohibition on "traditional" joint
representation is advisable because it "provides every client with an attorney who has a duty of loyalty
only to that client; an attorney who is obligated to honor a duty of confidentiality only to that client...
and an attorney who seeks the best solution as defined only by that client").
201. See supra Part lI.B.2.
202. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l. Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-390 (1995) [hereinafter ABA
Formal Op. No. 95-390] ("Clearly, the best solution to the problems that may arise by reason of clients'
corporate affiliations is to have a clear understanding between lawyer and client, at the very start of the
representation, as to which entity or entities in the corporate family are to be the lawyer's clients .. .
203. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
205. See ABA Formal Op. No. 95-390, supra note 202 (looking to particular circumstances to deter-
mine whether a lawyer represents a corporate affiliate of her client).
206. See supra note 25.
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ited liability company or other non-public entity with a small num-
bers of owners who are also the entity's management.
(a) For all "Internal Matters," the lawyer shall represent only one
owner, or one clearly aligned group of owners. Internal Matters are
those matters in which no party other than the owners or the entity
has a direct interest. The lawyer shall specify to all owners the iden-
tity of this internal client: (1) at the outset of representation, if rep-
resentation is undertaken before or during the organization of the
entity; or (2) before beginning work on any Internal Matter, if rep-
resentation is undertaken subsequent to the organization of the en-
tity.
(b) For all "External Matters," the lawyer shall represent the entity
acting through its duly authorized constituents. External Matters are
those matters in which the entity interacts with third parties. The
lawyer shall specify to all owners that the entity is the lawyer's ex-
ternal client at the outset of representation.
(c) If during the course of representation the lawyer is asked to
work on any matter in which the interests of the internal client and
external client actually conflict, the lawyer cannot represent either
client in the matter. If such interests potentially conflict, the lawyer
should typically refuse such representation out of an abundance of
caution, but may in some circumstances represent both clients if
such representation is permitted under Model Rule 1.7.
This rule recognizes the unique role played by closely held business law-
yers; namely, that of counselor to the individual owners as well as to the
entity. Part (a) addresses the lawyer's representation of individual owners. It
provides that the lawyer may represent only one owner, or one clearly
aligned group of owners. Otherwise, impermissible conflicts of interests
will arise. Lawyers will usually have an internal client-the only exception
is an established entity retaining a lawyer for a discrete task that does not
present any internal matters. Part (b) provides that the lawyer represents the
entity as well. Part (c) requires that a lawyer generally withdraw from repre-
sentation when the interests of her two clients actually or potentially con-
flict.
Because of the fundamental importance of establishing an attorney-
client relationship, the rule mandates that lawyers identify their clients at the
outset of representation, with one exception. Lawyers violating this mandate
could face disciplinary proceedings, not to mention potential civil liability
for malpractice. 07 No default rule is provided. Such a rule would be contra-
207. See Fisher, supra note 120, at 987 ("The lawyer, not the client, should bear the burden of ensur-
ing that no ambiguity or uncertainty exists with respect to who is and is not a client.").
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dictory to the mandatory identification requirement. However, this Article
provides suggestions for such a default rule to be employed as a last resort
since a lawyer's ethical violation still begs the question of client identity.
20 8
V. CONCLUSION: AN EVERYDAY PROBLEM-SOLVED
Representing organizations, and particularly closely held businesses, is
as common as representing individuals for many lawyers. But, these law-
yers often fail to appreciate the ethical concerns presented by organizational
representation. There are well-established rules for representing traditional,
public corporations. Unlike traditional corporations, however, the interests
and identities of closely held businesses are often indistinguishable from
those of their individual owners. Consequently, identifying the lawyer's
client or clients is more difficult in this setting.
Lawyers who represent closely held businesses often overlook the sub-
tle distinctions between representing the entity and its individual owners.
They equate advice to an owner with advice to the entity. Only when the
interests of the entity and the owner diverge will lawyers pay attention to
the distinction. But often it is too late. The importance of proper client iden-
tification cannot be overstated: it determines to whom the lawyer owes du-
ties, whose confidences the lawyer must keep, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, how to identify and properly handle conflicts of interest (which arise
far more frequently than is generally thought).
This Article reveals what I believe to be the most significant shortcom-
ing of the current ethical rules, court decisions, and scholarly debate regard-
ing a lawyer's representation of closely held businesses: namely, that con-
flicts among individual owners are unavoidable at all stages. In order to
properly address these conflicts, one-and only one-individual owner
must be established as the lawyer's internal client. The entity is also a cli-
ent-the lawyer's external client.
This is not to suggest that it is inappropriate for a lawyer to form an en-
tity and draft its internal governing documents single-handedly; multiple
lawyers handling this task would most likely be inefficient and cost-
prohibitive for typical closely held business clients. My proposed solution
allows for, and even encourages, multiple representation in this context. But
multiple representation is proposed only after dividing the lawyer's world
into internal and external matters and establishing internal and external cli-
ents. Once the lawyer's world is so divided, those not represented will not
have expectations that the lawyer is protecting their interests and can seek
separate counsel if they so desire, and the lawyer's duties can be fulfilled
free from conflict.
208. See supra Part ll/.A.2.d.
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